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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, North Dakota surpassed every state except Texas in
1
oil production. It is common knowledge that the oil boom has
flooded the state with money and allowed it to maintain impressive
budget surpluses while other states in the nation saw distinct
2
budget shortfalls. There are, however, many negative impacts of
the oil boom: farmers and ranchers dealing with the impacts of
energy development are often frustrated by a distinct disparity
between the talk of money flooding into the state, and what is
perceived as a confusing parsimony when it comes to compensating
landowners for land that is taken or damaged by the energy
3
industry.
This Article will provide background information regarding
4
environmental damage caused by energy development, and will
consider the remedies available in North Dakota for landowners,
1. Stephen J. Lee, N.D. Becomes No. 2 Oil Producing State, Trailing Only Texas,
BAKKEN TODAY (May 16, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.bakkentoday.com/event
/article/id/33956.
2. See Dennis Cauchon, North Dakota Economy Booms, Population Soars, USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2011, 5:59 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation
/census/2011-03-16-north-dakota-census_N.htm.
3. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag & Robert Gebeloff, The Downside of the Boom,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/23/us
/north-dakota-oil-boom-downside.html?_r=0.
4. See infra Part II.
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with comparisons to certain trends and remedies around the
5
country. Further, it will argue that the remedies generally available
are in need of reconsideration, and that legal interpretations
asserted by the energy industry are often erroneous, and more
importantly, unnecessarily attempt to limit the recovery of
landowners whose land has been taken or damaged for energy
6
development. The Article will focus on North Dakota law and
cases, and the author’s experience litigating on behalf of
landowners in North Dakota.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2014, the New York Times reported that “[f]or those who
champion fossil fuels as the key to America’s energy independence,
7
North Dakota is an unrivaled success.” It also noted that “state
leaders rarely mention the underside of the boom and do not
release even summary statistics about environmental incidents and
8
enforcement measures.” Between April 1, 2010, and July 1, 2014,
North Dakota’s population grew by 9.9 percent, three times the
9
rate of the nation in general. In recent years, North Dakota has
had record budget surpluses while the rest of the nation has
10
struggled. The budget surplus in June of 2011 was $996.8 million,
which was the highest end-of-biennium balance in North Dakota’s
11
history.
But while North Dakota’s coffers have been full, not all North
Dakotans have benefited equally from the oil boom. For the owners
of the surface of the land, things do not always look as positive.
According to one report, “more than 18.4 million gallons of oils
and chemicals spilled, leaked or misted into the air, soil and waters
12
of North Dakota from 2006 through early October 2014.” Another
more recent report in 2015 indicates that “the spill rate per well
5. See infra Parts III–IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See QuickFacts: North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html (last visited May 12, 2016).
10. See N.D. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, NORTH DAKOTA REV-E-NEWS
(2011),
https://www.nd.gov/omb/sites/omb/files/documents/newsletters
/201109news.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Sontag & Gebeloff, supra note 3.
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almost tripled between 2004 and 2013. On average, more than two
13
gallons of this wastewater spill per minute in North Dakota.” Kris
Roberts, an inspector for the North Dakota Department of Health,
told one reporter: “We have pipeline leaks, lightning strikes, leaks
at oil well sites, we have illegal discharges by truckers who do not
want to wait at saltwater disposal wells . . . . If there’s a way it can
14
happen, it probably will.” Dave Glatt is the head of the North
15
Dakota Department of Health’s Environmental Health Section.
16
Mr. Glatt stated that wastewater spills are his “biggest worry.” He
said, “My concern is, if we don’t get a handle on this, if we don’t
have appropriate remediation technologies, that we’ll have a
17
landscape that is pockmarked with . . . dead zones.”
North Dakota regulators have taken heat for their comfortable
18
relationship with the oil industry and lack of enforcement. Jeff
Keller, a natural resource manager for the Army Corps of
Engineers, when asked about enforcement by North Dakota state
19
agencies, said “There’s no enforcement . . . . None.”

13. Emily Guerin, In North Dakota, Oilfield Spill Problems Worsen, INSIDE ENERGY
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/01/28/in-north-dakota-oilfield
-spill-problems-worsen.
14. Emily Guerin, Saltwater Spills Leave North Dakota Farmland Sterile for Years,
INSIDE ENERGY (Aug. 27, 2014), http://insideenergy.org/2014/08/27/saltwater
-spills-leave-north-dakota-farmland-sterile-for-years.
15. Department Overview: Environmental Health Section, N.D. DEPT. HEALTH
[hereinafter Environmental Health Section], https://www.ndhealth.gov/DoH
/Overview (last visited May 12, 2016).
16. Guerin, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. See Andrew Brown, Landowners from the Oil Patch Believe State Is Bowing to
Oil Companies, Threaten Litigation, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Dec. 9, 2014), http://
www.grandforksherald.com/news-business/landowners-oil-patch-believe-state
-bowing-oil-companies-threaten-litigation-3631135; Emily Guerin, State Officials
Misrepresent North Dakota’s Spill Problem, INSIDE ENERGY (Feb. 16, 2015), http://
insideenergy.org/2015/02/16/state-officials-misrepresent-north-dakotas-spill
-problem; Nicholas Kusnetz, North Dakota’s Oil Boom Brings Damage Along with
Prosperity, PROPUBLICA (June 7, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article
/the-other-fracking-north-dakotas-oil-boom-brings-damage-along-with-prosperi;
Deborah Sontag, Where Oil and Politics Mix, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/24/us/north-dakota-oil-boom-politics
.html; Tu-Uyen Tran, North Dakota Gets D- in 2015 State Integrity Investigation,
WDAY6 (Nov. 11, 2015, 6:46 AM), http://www.wday.com/news/3880422-north
-dakota-gets-d-2015-state-integrity-investigation.
19. Kusnetz, supra note 18.
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Putting aside a lack of enforcement, landowners are often left
in the lurch even if there is adequate enforcement of state
regulations. Karl Rockeman is the Director of the North Dakota
Department of Health’s Division of Water Quality under the
20
Environmental Health Section. Mr. Rockeman responded to
questions about whether the Department of Health’s remediation
standards protect landowners, and admitted under oath that “[t]he
department recognizes that our standards are to protect water
quality and that there may be subsequent damage, loss of
productivity, [and] other damages to personal property that are
21
outside of our scope of authority.” The Department of Health
recently sent out notice of draft remediation guidelines that state
explicitly: “In order to prevent loss of productivity on agricultural
lands and subsequent private property damage, lower constituent
levels may be needed. These levels should be negotiated between
the landowner and responsible party and are not required by the
22
[North Dakota Department of Health].”
One of the most surprising aspects of the oil boom, however, is
that so many of the negative impacts are borne by the owners of the
surface lands, whose rights are trumped by those of the mineral
23
owners. From the use of eminent domain for oil pipelines to
construction of well pads, there are several situations in which a
surface owner has no right to say “no” to development, and is
24
limited to the payment of damages. As such, the way the legal
system views and quantifies the types of damages due to the owners
of the land’s surface is crucial to developing oil and gas in a
25
manner that is just and fair for those living on the land.
It is the author’s experience that too often damages to surface
owners are limited by law, or at times, by the erroneous
understandings and interpretations of the law advocated by the oil
26
and gas industry. For example, in some situations, North Dakota
20. See Environmental Health Section, supra note 15.
21. Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Karl Rockeman, In re Peterson
v. Ballantyne Oil, No. 20130537 (N.D. Indus. Comm’n Jan. 20, 2015) (on file with
author).
22. DIV. WATER QUALITY, N.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR THE
ASSESSMENT AND CLEANUP OF SALTWATER RELEASES (DRAFT) (2014) (on file with
author).
23. See infra Parts III–IV.
24. See infra Parts III–IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See, e.g., 1-2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
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law caps damages to real estate at the fair market value of the
27
land. This leads to a certain mentality in the industry that
destruction of land is acceptable, so long as market value is paid.
Thus, an operator may spill saltwater on three acres of land, and if
similar land previously sold for $750 per acre, the operator simply
offers $2,250 and considers this fair. What the operator does not
understand is that the land was not for sale, and worse, the land
may be sterilized for decades, meaning the farmer will endure a
loss of productive value that may exceed the fair market value of
that land. The following sections of this Article will address some of
the situations in which courts are tasked with determining the
damages to surface owners, and it will discuss the positive and
negative aspects of both current law and potential changes to
current law.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS RELATED TO JUST
COMPENSATION
In eminent domain cases, it is always the situation that the
landowner is having her land taken against her will. Traditional
appraisal methodologies often result in a conclusion that there are
no damages for certain purposes associated with energy
development, such as electric transmission lines and oil and gas
28
pipelines. This creates an obvious conflict with the constitutional
requirement that landowners receive “just compensation” for the
29
taking of their land.
The infrastructure necessary for oil and gas development was,
to a great extent, underdeveloped in North Dakota when the boom
got underway. Certain projects, such as Enbridge’s Sandpiper
pipeline, Basin Electric Power Cooperative’s recent transmission
line, and the proposed Dakota Access pipeline, are among the
types of projects authorized by statute to take land by eminent
30
domain under the power of the State. While statutory authority
§ 218 (2015).
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-09.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.).
28. See, e.g., Thomas O. Jackson & Jennifer M. Pitts, The Effects of Electric
Transmission Lines on Property Values: A Literature Review, 18 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE
239 (2010) (concluding that with use of paired sales analysis, transmission lines
and pipelines often have little to no impact on market values).
29. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16.
30. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-02 (Westlaw). For further description
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exists for these projects to use eminent domain, that authority is
31
not unassailable. Landowners may challenge the use of eminent
32
domain for these projects, but most eminent domain cases will
33
focus on the valuation of the property being taken.
This valuation then becomes crucial to assuring that the
landowner obtains an appropriate remedy for the taking.
A.

The Problem with Standard Appraisal Methodology

North Dakota law requires that, “[a]s far as practicable,
compensation must be assessed separately for property actually
34
taken and for damages to that which is not taken.” This analysis
becomes difficult to apply in the situation of a partial taking for a

of selected oil and gas development projects, see Antelope Valley Station to Neset
https://
Transmission
Project,
BASIN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE,
www.basinelectric.com/Projects/North-Dakota-Transmission/index.html
(last
visited May 12, 2016); Overview of the Dakota Access Pipeline, ENERGY TRANSFER,
http://www.daplpipelinefacts.com/about/overview.html (last visited May 15,
2016); Sandpiper Pipeline Project, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com
/SandpiperProject.aspx (last visited May 15, 2016).
31. See, e.g., Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 765 (N.D. 2015)
(citing Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363
S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012)); Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 523
(N.D. 1976) (“Where the existence or non-existence of public use is placed in
issue, the determination, dependent as it is upon the facts and circumstances of
the matter, is properly a judicial one.”); see also, e.g., Cty. of Haw. v. C & J Coupe
Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008); Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Oak
Grove & G.R. Co., 43 So. 292, 294 (Miss. 1907) (“[W]henever an attempt is made
to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined
without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.”); Middletown Twp. v.
Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007); Tex. Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at
194–95 (remanding to trial court after holding that “[a] private enterprise cannot
acquire unchallengeable condemnation power under [Texas law] merely by
checking boxes on a one-page form and self-declaring its common-carrier status.
Merely holding oneself out is insufficient under Texas law to thwart judicial
review”).
32. See supra note 31.
33. See Paul W. Moomaw, Fire Sale! The Admissibility of Evidence of Environmental
Contamination to Determine Just Compensation in Washington Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2001) (citing William B. Stoebuck, Real
Estate: Property Law, in 17 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 9.1 (1995)) (“This portion of
the proceeding tends to be the most hotly debated: the great majority of eminent
domain cases focus upon the issue of the proper measure of just compensation.”).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(5) (Westlaw).
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transmission line or pipeline. Responding to this potential
confusion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota set forth a
common valuation methodology in Northern States Power Co. v.
Effertz:
[I]t would be simpler, less confusing, or in other words
much more practicable to award compensation upon the
basis of the damage done to [a] tract . . . to the remainder
of the farm unit. The damage to the tract, whatever its
size, would simply be the difference between its
reasonable market value before the [damage] and its
reasonable market value thereafter. Such an award would
give the land owner full compensation without requiring
the jury to make difficult, confusing and sometimes
35
impossible computations.
The determination of market value, however, is what creates
the inadequacy with damages in these situations. The standard
appraisal methodology, called the comparable sales approach,
requires the appraiser to find sales of similar properties close in
time to the subject property and assess the value based on those
36
sales. Combining this with the methodology described in the
Effertz case, the methodology is to determine the loss in market
value based on sales without a similar encumbrance and reduce it
based on the market value of sales of similar land with a similar
encumbrance.
The problem with this methodology becomes clear when real
estate appraisers start offering opinions in eminent domain cases.
The standard appraisal methodology often results in a landowner
37
receiving little more than nominal compensation, if that. Many
appraisers come to the conclusion that there is no impact on the
38
value of the land. There are, however, other effective ways for
landowners to present evidence regarding the just compensation
they are due when their land is taken, such as offering testimony of
compensation paid for easements similar to those being taken via
39
eminent domain.

35. N. States Power Co. v. Effertz, 94 N.W.2d 288, 294 (N.D. 1958).
36. See, e.g., 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 27 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Jackson & Pitts, supra note 28, at 258 (concluding that, with use
of paired sales analysis, transmission lines and pipelines often have little to no
impact on market values).
38. Id.
39. See infra Part III.
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Wyoming is one state that has addressed valuation issues
explicitly through its eminent domain laws. Under Wyoming law:
(i) The fair market value of property for which there is a
relevant market is the price which would be agreed to by
an informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell,
and an informed buyer who is willing but not obligated to
buy;
(ii) The fair market value of property for which there is
no relevant market is its value as determined by any
method of valuation that is just and equitable;
(iii) The determination of fair market value shall use
generally accepted appraisal techniques and may include:
(A) The value determined by appraisal of the
property performed by a certified appraiser;
(B) The price paid for other comparable easements or leases
of comparable type, size and location on the same or similar
property;
(C) Values paid for transactions of comparable type, size
and location by other public or private entities in arms length
transactions for comparable transactions on the same or
40
similar property.
Commenting specifically on the provision that allows for
evidence of comparable easements, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming recognized:
[I]n some cases a partial taking may not reduce the value
of the remaining property, at least according to some
generally accepted appraisal techniques. By offering an
alternative method for measuring just compensation
when there is a partial taking which does not result in a
reduction in value of the remaining property, the
legislature assured a property owner would at least receive
41
compensation for the value of the land taken.
While North Dakota’s eminent domain laws are not as specific
42
as Wyoming’s, they do allow for the same type of evidence. North
Dakota law states, inter alia, that

40. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
41. Barlow Ranch, Ltd. P’ship v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 301 P.3d 75, 84–85
(2013).
42. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704 (Westlaw), with N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 32-15-22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legis.
Assemb.).
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[t]he jury, or court, or referee, if a jury is waived, must
hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings and thereupon must ascertain
and assess[] the value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon pertaining to
the realty and of each and every separate estate or interest
therein. If it consists of different parcels, the value of each
parcel and each estate and interest therein shall be
43
separately assessed.
An easement can be construed as “the . . . property sought to
be condemned” and can also be subsumed by the language
44
referring to “each estate and interest therein.” North Dakota’s
pattern jury instruction for damage valuation in an eminent
domain case provides additional support for this position. It states
that “[j]ust compensation for the property actually taken is the fair
45
market value of that property . . . .” “‘Fair market value’ is the
highest price for which the property can be sold in the open
market by a willing seller to a willing purchaser, neither party
acting under compulsion and both exercising reasonable
46
judgment.” Wyoming, for example, has recognized in its statutes
that the fair market value of other similar easements is one of the
best indicators of the fair market value of an easement being taken
47
through eminent domain proceedings.
The pattern jury
instruction from North Dakota also makes it clear that “[t]he
determination of value in a condemnation proceeding is not a
matter of a formula or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and
discretion based upon [the juror’s] consideration of all the
48
relevant facts in a particular case.”
Despite the language in North Dakota’s law and that of the
pattern jury instruction, the author’s experience is that operators
49
will argue that other easements are not competent evidence.
50
While these arguments have not always prevailed, it would be
43. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(1) (Westlaw).
44. Id.
45. STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D., NORTH DAKOTA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS no.
75.05 (2014) [hereinafter N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.sband.org
/UserFiles/files/pdfs/patternjuryinstruction/2014PatternJuryCivl.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B) (Westlaw).
48. N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 45, at no. 75.05.
49. See infra notes 56–59, 77–82 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Section III.B. In the Basin Electric v. Wayne Hauge proceedings,
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beneficial for landowners if the North Dakota Legislative Assembly
amended its eminent domain laws in the explicit manner that was
accomplished in Wyoming. The Wyoming statute recognizes what
many would consider common sense: If you want to know that
market value of an easement being taken by eminent domain, the
best evidence is consideration of other similar easements actually
bought on the open market.
B.

Evidentiary Challenges to Eminent Domain Valuations: The Story of
Botsford and Basin Electric Power Cooperative

Specific examples of evidentiary challenges by condemnors
illuminate why it is helpful for eminent domain valuation laws to be
as explicit as in Wyoming.
1.

North Dakota Pipeline Company v. James and Krista
Botsford: Under North Dakota Law, Easement Offers from the
Condemnor Should Be Admissible

In a recent high-profile case in North Dakota, North Dakota
Pipeline Co., LLC v. Botsford, the North Dakota Pipeline Company
(NDPC) sought to condemn an easement over the Botsfords’
51
property for an oil pipeline. The dispute arose from the
Botsfords’ refusal to grant an easement over their land for NDPC’s
52
Sandpiper pipeline.
According to one report, the Botsfords refused to grant the
easement because they “did not want to participate in a private
enterprise that would increase global warming and threaten the
53
lives of [their] heirs. This was a moral imperative . . . .” After Mr.
Botsford suggested to a company representative that they go
around his property, he said that the representative responded,
Judge Rustad allowed evidence of other easements to come into evidence. See infra
notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
51. N.D. Pipeline Co. LLC v. Botsford et al., No. 18-2014-CV-01058 (N.D.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), cert. granted, No. 20160017 (N.D. Jan. 1, 2016).
52. NDPC is a joint venture between Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. and
Williston Basin Pipe Line LLC, an indirect subsidiary of Marathon Petroleum
Corporation. See Sandpaper Pipeline Project, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com
/SandpiperProject.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016); see also Georgianne Nienaber,
Farmer Won’t Sell Easement So Enbridge Oil Is Suing, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2015,
8:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/farmer-wont
-sell-family-f_b_7960084.html.
53. Nienaber, supra note 52.
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“Enbridge [doesn’t] go around anything—they go through it.” In
the end, NDPC was granted the right to exercise eminent domain
55
and a trial was held on the issue of just compensation.
NDPC had made an offer to the Botsfords for the easement
56
and the Botsfords sought to introduce the offer at trial. NDPC
argued that its offer for the easement should be excluded as
57
evidence under rule 408 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence,
58
which prohibits introduction of offers of compromise as evidence.
NDPC argued as follows:
Evidence of pre-condemnation offers is not admissible to
prove just compensation at trial. North Dakota Rule of
Evidence 408, subdivision (a)(l), bars evidence that a
party offered “valuable consideration in . . . attempting to
compromise” a claim, if the evidence is offered “to prove
. . . the amount of a disputed claim.” Similarly, “conduct
[and]
statement[s]
made
during
compromise
negotiations” cannot be offered to prove or disprove the
validity of an amount in controversy. “The policy
underlying this rule is the furtherance of compromise and
settlement of disputes among parties.” It reflects a
determination that “open and effective discussions of
compromise” are only possible where “the parties know in
advance that they will not jeopardize their case by fully
54. Id.
55. See Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV-01058.
56. Id.
57. North Dakota Rule of Evidence 408 states:
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible, on
behalf of any party, either to prove or disprove the validity or amount
of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or
a contradiction:
(1) furnishing, promising, offering, accepting, promising to
accept, or offering to accept a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise
negotiations.
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another
purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution. The court need not exclude evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations.
N.D. R. EVID. 408.
58. See Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV-01058.
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discussing all aspects of a claim.” NDPC’s pre-litigation
offer was intended to obtain an easement in the Botsfords
fee property without resorting to litigation. The
declarations contained in the offer constitute “conduct”
and “statements” made during compromise negotiations;
they are, therefore, inadmissible. Furthermore, under
North Dakota law, offers of compromise made before the
filing of an action are still barred by Rule 408. Therefore,
it is of no legal consequence that the offer predated
59
initiation of the condemnation proceedings.
The Botsfords responded, arguing that NDPC’s offer to the
Botsfords is not an “offer to compromise” that is covered by Rule
60
408. Although NDPC referred to its offer as an “offer to
compromise,” it failed to address the specifics of the actual offer, as
well as the specific legal context in which the offer was made, both
of which show that it was not, indeed, an offer to compromise.
It is illuminating to examine the actual easement offer that
NDPC sought to exclude. It stated: “NDPL hereby offers to you the
amount of Thirty Eight Thousand Sixty Two dollars ($38,062.00) as
full monetary compensation for the easement and workspace land
61
value.” The offer also indicates that it is an “offer to purchase an
62
easement.” On the third page of the offer, it lists the documents
enclosed, one of which is titled “Grand Forks County Market
63
Analysis Summary.” Below the listed item, it explains, “This
Market Analysis Summary is enclosed to support the valuation as it was
64
applied to your property, and is for your review.”
NDPC cited to McCormick on Evidence, section 274, in support
of its position, but in its argument it left out a much more
important and pertinent part of the discussion from that treatise.
As stated in that treatise:
59. Id.; Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, Botsford, No.
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 106 (on file with the author) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Botsford, No.
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 107 (on file with the author) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
60. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Botsford, No.
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 109 (on file with author).
61. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Derrick Braaten, Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV01058, Doc No. 111 [hereinafter Exhibit A] (on file with the author) (emphasis
added).
62. See id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
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To call into play the exclusionary rule, there must be an
actual dispute, or at least an apparent difference of view
between the parties as to the validity or amount of the
claim. An offer to pay an admitted claim is not privileged.
There is no policy of encouraging compromises of
65
undisputed claims. They should be paid in full.
There was no question that NDPC was required to pay just
66
compensation to the Botsfords in the condemnation proceeding.
The fact that the Botsfords were attempting to submit NDPC’s offer
as evidence makes it clear that the Botsfords did not dispute that
the amount offered was sufficient to evidence just compensation
for the easement. Therefore, the claim was undisputed, and should
have been paid in full as per NDPC’s offer of just compensation,
and the exclusionary rule cited by NDPC is inapplicable.
Further, the mandate of North Dakota Century Code section
32-15-06.1 cannot be ignored. This section first requires the
following: “Before initiating negotiations for the purchase of
property, the condemnor shall establish an amount which it
believes to be just compensation therefor and promptly shall
submit to the owner an offer to acquire the property for the full
67
amount so established.” Additionally, “[t]he condemnor shall
provide the owner of the property with . . . a written statement and
summary, showing the basis for the amount it established as just
68
compensation for the property.” NDPC’s offer indicated that it
69
was intended to comply with this mandate. After indicating the
amount of the offer, NDPC explained that “[t]he enclosed
Calculation Sheet and Statement of Value and Summary explain
70
how this amount was determined.” Included with the offer was
NDPC’s “Grand Forks County Market Analysis Summary,” which
NDPC explained to the Botsfords was a “Market Analysis Summary
. . . [which] support[s] the valuation as it was applied to your

65. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274 (2d ed. 1972); accord MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 266 (7th ed. 2013).
66. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to . . .
the owner.”).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-06.1(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.).
68. Id. § 32-15-06.1(4).
69. See Exhibit A, supra note 61.
70. Id.
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71

property . . . .” As is required by section 32-15-06.1(2), NDPC
established through its analysis what it believed to be “just
compensation,” and then forwarded this offer to the Botsfords.
Therefore, there was no better evidence of “[t]he value of the
72
property sought to be condemned” —in this case, an easement
over the Botsford’s land.
The requirement that a condemnor determine what it believes
to be “just compensation” should not be an idle act. If a
condemnor follows the dictate of this law, then there is no question
that its original offer based on its determination should be the
floor for establishing just compensation for the taking.
2.

Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. Wayne Hauge:
Easement Offers from Third Parties Should Be Admissible
a.

Easement Offers Are Competent Evidence of Market Value

Another challenge to traditional appraisal methodology in
North Dakota recently came in Basin Electric Power Cooperative v.
73
Wayne Hauge. Basin Electric Power Cooperative (Basin) filed an
action to condemn an easement for an electric transmission line
74
across Mr. Hauge’s property. Mr. Hauge’s resistance to the taking
was based on the fact that the land over which Basin wanted an
easement was his family’s homestead, and he had made a decision
75
to never allow another easement on that land. Nonetheless, Basin
was allowed to take an easement via eminent domain authority, and
Mr. Hauge found himself at a trial regarding just compensation for
76
the taking. One of the issues at the trial, however, was whether Mr.
Hauge could offer testimony regarding other easements he had
77
negotiated on his land. As was argued, no one knows the land
78
better than the landowner himself.

71. Id.
72. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(1) (Westlaw).
73. No. 53-2014-CV-00695 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2016) (on file with author).
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Derrick Braaten, AgVocate: Our Land Is Not for Sale, AGWEEK
(Dec. 9, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.agweek.com/columns/derrick-braaten
/3898104-agvocate-our-land-not-sale.
76. Hauge, No. 53-2014-CV-00695.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Mr. Hauge intended to submit other easement offers as
evidence of the market value for the easement Basin sought to take,
and Basin objected that in the other transactions, the company
79
buying the pipeline easement was not a “willing buyer.” The court
allowed Mr. Hauge to testify as to the value of the other easements,
and Basin was allowed to cross-examine and produce its own
80
evidence in rebuttal. An appraiser hired by Basin testified that
when a company is seeking an easement for a pipeline or
transmission line route, the company is limited to a linear corridor
81
and therefore is not a willing buyer. On cross-examination,
however, the appraiser admitted that the company was the one who
chose the route, and was able to deviate from the route if it so
82
chose. In the end, the issue of whether a company in another
transaction was or was not a willing buyer is a fact issue, the
determination of which should be made by the fact-finder.
b.

Landowner Testimony Regarding Market Value Is Subject to
Cross-Examination, But Should Not Be Excluded Based on
Foundation

Landowners are given significant latitude in North Dakota to
testify on the issue of valuation of real property. “The general rule
is that an owner of property may testify without qualification other
83
than the fact of ownership as to its value.” This rule holds true not
84
only in North Dakota, but in numerous other jurisdictions. This is
an exception to the rule that lay witnesses typically may not offer
85
opinion testimony. While not controlling precedent in all
jurisdictions, in response to the apparent concerns of condemnors
who might object to such lay opinion testimony, the Supreme

79. Id. The proceedings were held on record in the chambers of Judge
Joshua B. Rustad.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing the testimony of Joe Ibach in open court).
82. Id.
83. Pfliger v. Peavey Co., 310 N.W.2d 742, 747 (N.D. 1981).
84. See, e.g., 3 FRED LANE, LANE GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 16:17 (3d ed.
2015) (detailing cases from numerous jurisdictions where such opinion testimony
was allowed).
85. See generally J.E. Macy, Annotation, Competency of a Witness to Give Expert
Opinion Testimony as to Value of Real Property, 159 A.L.R. 7 (1946); see also N.D. R.
EVID. 701. Other jurisdictions’ Rule 701 also regulate opinion testimony by lay
witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 701; MINN. R. EVID. 701.
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Court of Arkansas offered a helpful and concise explanation of the
rule:
Of course, such opinion testimony, either by the
landowner or his value witnesses, may be stricken on
motion if there is no fair or logical basis for its support.
Once the landowner or his qualified expert witness has
expressed into evidence his opinion as to fair market
values, the burden then shifts to the condemnor to show
by cross-examination that the landowner or the witnesses
has no logical basis to support his opinion before such
testimony is subject to being stricken from the record on
motion. If on cross-examination, the condemnor is unable
to draw from the landowner or his expert witness more
than a weak or questionable basis for his opinion, that fact
has a bearing on the weight to be given the testimony by
the jury, and the testimony should not be stricken on
86
motion.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has stated that the
“liberal rule that permits an owner to testify concerning the value
of his property is based upon a presumed familiarity with the
subject, acquired from having purchased it or from having gained a
87
knowledge in some other way, sufficient to qualify him.”
C.

Courts Should Continue Liberally Applying the Landowner Testimony
Rule Based Upon the Landowner’s Presumed Familiarity with the
Land and Its Value

Although North Dakota and other jurisdictions have liberal
rules that allow landowners to testify as to the value of their own
property, there will always be condemnors and other parties who
will attempt to restrict that testimony as much as possible, as
exemplified by the arguments made by NDPC and Basin. As the
Wyoming Legislature explicitly recognized, however, there are
times when the typical appraisal methodology of looking at the
parcel of land before and after the hypothetical easement results in
88
nominal or no compensation for the landowner. Indeed, North

86. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Jones, 505 S.W.2d 210, 211–12 (Ark.
1974) (citations omitted).
87. Alm Constr. Co. v. Vertin, 118 N.W.2d 737, 748 (N.D. 1962) (internal
quotations omitted).
88. See N. States Power Co. v. Effertz, 94 N.W.2d 288, 294 (N.D. 1958); 60 AM.
JUR. Trials, supra note 36.
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Dakota’s Constitution, like many other state constitutions, states
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid
89
into court for the owner . . . .” It is simply not possible for just
compensation to be “first made to [the landowner] or paid into
court” if the condemnor’s appraiser is correct that there is no loss
to the value of the land, and therefore no payment whatsoever to
make to the landowner or deposit with the court. As such, the
courts need to recognize a liberal rule allowing landowners to
testify, especially considering that the landowners are typically
being sued by large entities who can afford to hire expensive
appraisers, which was the case in Basin Electric.
IV. DAMAGES TO REAL ESTATE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS RELATED
TO ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM OIL AND
GAS DEVELOPMENT
There are also problems with valuation of damages to real
estate outside of the eminent domain context, specifically because
the concept of diminution in market value is still pertinent to these
valuations. Although there is a separate body of case law and
different laws that apply, the energy industry applies the same
reasoning to the damage it causes outside of the context of
eminent domain.
In North Dakota and in some other states, practitioners in the
oil and gas industry typically distinguish between expected damages
from construction of well pads and access roads, and other
90
unanticipated damages from, for example, oil and saltwater spills.
As will be explained, oil and gas operators typically have certain
rights to use of the surface, and that use only gives rise to damages
91
when a statute creates the right for damages. On the other hand,
if the use of the land goes beyond the rights of the operator to use

89. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16.
90. See generally Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-014, 2010 WL 4260103,
at *1 (D.N.D. Oct. 22, 2010). The court in this case explained that prior to
adoption of the compensation statute, surface owners did not have an accepted
right to compensation for reasonable use of the surface. Id. at *2. The implied
conclusion as recognized by other courts is that a use beyond that which is
reasonably necessary will give rise to an action for damages. See Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971).
91. Kartch, 2010 WL 4260103, at *1.
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the surface for production, such as with a spill, then common law
92
actions are available.
A.

The Split Estate and the Implied Easement

To understand the interplay between these different categories
of damages and corresponding rights, it is necessary to understand
the nature of the split estate. A split estate refers to a situation in
which the owner of the surface of land is different than the owner
93
of the minerals. The mineral estate is dominant over the surface
estate, and the mineral estate affords its owner an implied servitude
94
for access to and use of the surface estate. Additionally, the
granting of an oil and gas lease by a mineral owner gives the lessee
95
under such a lease these same rights.
Whether the express uses are set out or not, the mere
granting of the lease creates and vests in the lessee the
dominant estate in the surface of the land for the
purposes of the lease; by implication it grants the lessee
the use of the surface to the extent necessary to a full
96
enjoyment of the grant.
Landowners in North Dakota and their attorneys are faced
with myriad issues when the fee simple absolute estate is severed,
particularly with respect to minerals such as oil and gas. The fee
simple estate can be split by a reservation of minerals in a deed or
other conveyance, or by a grant of any or all of the minerals
97
underlying the surface estate. “Minerals in place are land, and
98
may be conveyed as other lands are conveyed.” “After severance,
the surface and minerals are held by separate and distinct titles in
99
severalty, and each is a freehold estate of inheritance.”
92.
93.

Id.
For further explanation of the split estate, see Split Estate, BUREAU
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/oil_and_gas/best
_management_practices/split_estate.html (last visited May 15, 2016).
94. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979) (“[T]he
surface estate is servient in the sense it is charged with the servitude for those
essential rights of the mineral estate.”); see also Christina v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d
543, 550 (N.D. 1973) (describing the attendant rights of the owner of a surface
estate and those of a mineral owner).
95. Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969).
96. Id.
97. See Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 180 N.W. 787, 789 (N.D. 1920).
98. Id.
99. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 1956) (internal quotations
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Different strata and different minerals may be severed
100
separately. The most common situation in the North Dakota oil
patch is a split estate involving one person who owns the surface
estate, and one or more others who own the mineral rights
101
underlying that surface estate. Landowners and their lawyers
must understand the basic rights that belong to the owner of the
surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate.
The rights granted to the dominant estate owner are limited:
“[T]he rights of the owner of the mineral estate are limited to so
much of the surface and such use thereof as are [r]easonably
102
necessary to explore, develop, and transport the materials.”
In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, the seminal case regarding the rights of
the mineral owner in a split estate situation, the Texas Supreme
Court explained the concept of due regard, and adopted what has
103
come to be known as the “accommodation doctrine.” Essentially,
the accommodation doctrine requires due regard for the surface

omitted).
100. See, e.g., Beulah Coal Mining, 180 N.W. at 787.
101. See, e.g., Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979);
Beulah Coal Mining, 180 N.W. at 787.
102. Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 135; see also Union Producing Co. v. Pittman,
146 So.2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962) (citation omitted) (“[A] grant or reservation of
mines or minerals gives to the mineral owner the incidental right of entering,
occupying, and making such use of the surface lands as is reasonably necessary in
exploring, mining, removing, and marketing the minerals.”). According to the
Union Producing court:
[T]he question of what is a reasonable use of the premises is a question
of fact, and although the drilling operator may use as much of the
surface as may be reasonably necessary, he cannot be unreasonable in
the use of such land, nor oppressive or capricious in its use. The owner
of the minerals may do what is reasonably necessary to recover
minerals, but the mineral owner or agent is not the final judge as to
what is reasonably necessary. This is a question of fact for the
determination of the jury.
Union Producing Co., 146 So.2d at 555–56; see also Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 137
(citations omitted) (“Whether or not the use of the surface estate by the mineral
estate owner is reasonably necessary is a question of fact for the trier of facts.”).
Further informing the determination of reasonable use of the surface is “the
concept that the owner of the mineral estate must have due regard for the rights
of the surface owner and is required to exercise that degree of care and use which
is a just consideration for the rights of the surface owner.” Hunt Oil Co., 283
N.W.2d at 135 (citations omitted).
103. 470 S.W.2d at 622–23; see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 26.
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104

owner and his use of the property. While the mineral owner may
have the right to do what is reasonably necessary to obtain
production of the minerals, if there are alternatives available to the
mineral developer, some of which harm the surface use, and some
which do not, the mineral developer generally must utilize the
105
alternative that does not disrupt the surface use.
Jurisdictions vary in the degree to which they apply the
concept of “due regard” or “reasonable accommodation,” more
frequently known as the “accommodation doctrine.” Prior to the
Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Getty Oil, Texas followed the
106
unidimensional “reasonably necessary” test.
Many states,
including North Dakota, have now adopted the accommodation
107
doctrine. A closer look at the language in Hunt Oil helps shed
light on the position North Dakota has taken regarding the
accommodation doctrine:
We agree a pure balancing test is not involved under the
accommodation
doctrine
where
no
reasonable
alternatives are available. Where alternatives do exist,
however, the concepts of due regard and reasonable
necessity do require a weighing of the different alternatives
against the inconveniences to the surface owner. Therefore,
once alternatives are shown to exist a balancing of the
108
mineral and surface owner’s interest does occur.

104. 470 S.W.2d at 622.
105. Id. (internal citations omitted) (“The due regard concept defines more
fully what is to be considered in the determination of whether a surface use by the
lessee is reasonably necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the surface
whereby the minerals can be produced. The lessee has the right to pursue this use,
regardless of surface damage. And there may be necessitous temporary use
governed by the same principle. But under the circumstances indicated here (i.e.,
where there is an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be
precluded or impaired) and where under the established practices in the industry
there are alternatives available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be
recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption
of an alternative by the lessee.”).
106. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 26 (“Excessive user has been found by
reason of . . . occupation of more of the surface than was reasonably necessary for
the full enjoyment of the minerals . . . .” (citation omitted)).
107. Id.; see also Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d 131 at 137 (applying the
accommodation doctrine).
108. Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d 131 at 137 (citing Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at
623) (emphasis added). The court also noted:
It is important to note that the Texas Supreme Court in Getty
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Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Texas
insofar as it did not adopt a pure balancing test, but it went further
than the Getty Oil court. Specifically, the court held by that, where
alternatives exist, there is a balancing that takes place between the
potential alternatives to the developer and the inconveniences to
109
the surface owner.
B.

Damages Arising from Well Site and Infrastructure Development
1.

Compensation Statutes and North Dakota’s Surface Damages Act

Pursuant to the common law discussed above, there was also
no legal requirement for a mineral developer to pay damages to
the surface owner if its use of the surface fell within its rights under
the implied easement. Prior to the adoption of certain statutes in
many of the oil-producing states, “[t]he rights of the surface owner
were perceived as being limited to seeking relief in tort if the
mineral owners [sic] use of the surface was unreasonable or
110
negligent.”

concluded the accommodation doctrine is not a balancing type test
weighing the harm or inconvenience to the owner of one type of
interest against the benefit to the other. Rather the court said the test
is the availability of alternative non-conflicting uses of the two types of
owners. Inconvenience to the surface owner is not the controlling
element where no reasonable alternatives are available to the mineral
owner or lessee. The surface owner must show that under the
circumstances, the use of the surface under attack is not reasonably
necessary.
Id.
109. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997).
The fact that neither the surface owner nor the severed mineral rights
holder has any absolute right to exclude the other from the surface
may create tension between competing surface uses. “The broad
principle by which these tensions are to be resolved is that each owner
must have due regard for the rights of the other in making use of the
estate in question.” This “due regard” concept requires mineral rights
holders to accommodate surface owners to the fullest extent possible
consistent with their right to develop the mineral estate.
Id. (citing Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1987))
110. Order Denying Motion to Strike Jury Demand, Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc.,
No. 4:10-cv-014 (D.N.D. Oct. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 4260103 at *2 (citing Murphy v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 554–56, 555 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984); Hunt Oil Co., 283
N.W.2d at 135 n.4).
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Due to the perceived inequities of this situation, many states
have passed surface damage compensation acts requiring
compensation even if the mineral owner has an implied easement
or an express lease. North Dakota passed the Oil and Gas
Production Damage Compensation Act (Surface Damage Act),
which provided, inter alia, a requirement that mineral developers
compensate surface estate owners for damage arising from
111
construction of well pads and access roads. The “purpose of [the
Surface Damage Act] is to provide the maximum amount of
constitutionally permissible protection to surface owners and other
persons from the undesirable effects of development of
112
minerals.” The primary provisions of the Surface Damage Act
provide various requirements for mineral developers to apprise
surface owners of anticipated activities, and most importantly, to
pay damages for damage to the surface estate arising from drilling
113
and production operations.
Although litigation in the state district courts is frequent, there
are only a handful of reported decisions on the Surface Damage
Act in North Dakota. One case brought pursuant to this statute,
Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., was the subject of a summary judgment
decision in the U.S. District Court for the District of North
114
Dakota. The court ruled on several damage items in a manner
inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Surface Damage
Act.
In Kartch, the court considered claims for “(1) excessive noise;
(2) contamination of soil and water; (3) diminished air quality, use
of flare, and excessive odors; (4) excessive litter; and (5) storage of
115
unnecessary equipment.”
With respect to the excessive noise, the surface owner testified:
I can hear that generator running in my home with the
windows closed. I can hear that generator running
virtually—I can hear the generator running from every
corner of any piece of property I own there. It appears to

111. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 38-11.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.).
112. Id. § 38-11.1-02.
113. See generally id. § 38-11.1-01 through -10.
114. Order Denying Motion to Strike Jury Demand, supra note 110.
115. Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1009 (D.N.D. Feb. 29,
2012).
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run consistently. It is very loud. And it prevents enjoyment
of my property.
....
It disrupts my ability to sleep. It disrupts my ability to
recreate or enjoy or work on my property. It constantly
116
runs.
The U.S. District Court addressed the surface owners’
complaints, stating that
[w]hile the Kartches complain that the noise produced by
the generator is excessive and hinders their ability to
enjoy the property, they do not claim that the noise is
inordinate or exceeds the normal level of noise created by
generators on active oil wells in North Dakota. A certain
117
amount of noise is inevitable in oil production.
Similarly, with respect to the flare on the property, the court
simply stated that such flaring is customary in the oil industry in
118
North Dakota and is therefore not a nuisance.
The court also found that “[t]he litter of which the Kartches
complain does not appear to be a persistent problem, nor does it
cause the unsanitary conditions that rise to the level of a nuisance,”
and that “as a matter of law, that ‘run-of-the-mill litter’ at the well
119
site d[id] not constitute a nuisance under North Dakota law.”
Finally, the court found that equipment stored at the well site also
120
did not constitute a nuisance.
This conclusion fails to
acknowledge the specific purpose of the Surface Damage Act.
While the court recognized that the Kartches’ pleadings
disclosed nuisance claims, it also recognized that these claims were
made pursuant to and were subsumed under the Surface Damage
121
Act. The court noted that “[i]t is clear that mineral developers
are responsible for damages ‘resulting from a nuisance caused by
122
drilling operations.’”
The district court’s analysis is not entirely inconsistent with
nuisance law in North Dakota, but its analysis fails to take into
account the need for interpreting a nuisance through the lens of
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1008–09.
Id. at 1008 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-06) (Westlaw)).
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the Surface Damage Act. In other words, a nuisance within the
context of damages alleged pursuant to the Surface Damage Act
should be analyzed differently than a nuisance claim unrelated to
oil and gas drilling and production operations. The North Dakota
Attorney General referred to testimony about the Surface Damage
Act in a 2007 opinion:
[The oil and gas company] usually but not always . . .
makes a one time offer to the surface owner for actual
surface damage. In the event of a dry hole the
compensation may be fair . . . but in the event of
production, which may be for 20 or 30 years of [sic] more,
the surface owner gets no consideration unless the
producer volunteers or the surface owner has to sue in
each instance and prove his claim . . . . We are reluctant to
be operating under present practices where the surface
owner has to sue in every instance where he feels he has
been damaged, and must prove his claim . . . . The trouble
with a one time settlement is that there is no way to
determine years in advance what actual damage, let alone
intangible damages might be. For instance, odor in the air,
management practices, working around oil equipment, danger to
health of humans and livestock, loss of water wells and springs.
Then too, salt and oil spills, corrosion on metal buildings,
machinery and wire by hydrogen sulfide gas, loss of use of surface,
cattle passes, roads, pipelines and traffic, flair [sic] outs, fires,
123
pollution, trespassing and depreciated value of surface.
These were precisely the type of damages alleged by the
surface owners in Kartch, and the Surface Damage Act should not
be interpreted to have the same constraints as a common law
nuisance claim.
The interpretation of the district court in Kartch fails to
acknowledge that the Surface Damage Act was intended to
compensate surface owners for precisely the types of damages the
court disallowed. By ruling that the noise from EOG’s generator
was not a nuisance because the noise did not “exceed[] the normal
level of noise created by generators on active oil wells in North
124
Dakota,” the court frustrated the intent of the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly. The Assembly recognized that oil and gas
123. Letter from Wayne Stenehjem, N.D. Att’y Gen., to Lynn D. Helms, Dir.,
Oil & Gas Div., N.D. Indus. Comm’n, 2007 WL 780365, at *2 (Mar. 13, 2007)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (statement of Rep. Murphy).
124. Kartch, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
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production brings additional noise, gas flares can be loud and
often emit a noxious smell, and that additional traffic servicing the
oil field can be a nuisance to the people living in the oilfield, and it
125
intended that they be compensated for these things. To limit
recovery because such nuisances are common in the oilfield misses
the point. The only limits the Assembly intended to allow to the
126
damages a surface owner can recover are constitutional limits.
2.

Unforeseen Environmental Damages

Although most claims related to oilfield damages are
encompassed by North Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1, some
of the extraordinary damages occasioned by pipeline ruptures and
well blowouts can also be brought under different legal theories,
such as trespass. There is a common restriction on damages to real
estate, however, which typically limits damages for restoration of
the property when those damages exceed the diminution in the fair
127
market value of the property. As previously discussed, this rule
creates a warped perspective for operators in which the only
ramification of destroying land is to pay its market value based on
128
past agricultural sales, even when the land was not for sale.
a.

Some Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Problem with a Fair
Market Value Cap and Adjusted Accordingly

Some courts have changed their thinking on damages to real
property arising from oil and gas production, doing away with a
concrete restriction on restoration damages. For example, in
Ruffatto v. EOG Resources, Inc., a federal district court in Montana
applied the diminution in value damage cap to a surface damage
129
act substantially similar to North Dakota’s. The Ruffatto opinion,
125. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02 (Westlaw) (“It is the purpose of this
chapter to provide the maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection to
surface owners and other persons from the undesirable effects of development of
minerals. This chapter is to be interpreted in light of the legislative intent
expressed herein.” (emphasis added)).
127. See, e.g., id. § 32-03-09.1.
128. See supra Part III. While there may be other ramifications related to the
regulatory authorities, such ramifications are not necessarily focused on making
the landowner whole.
129. Ruffatto v. EOG Res., Inc., CV-06-32-BLG-RFC, at 4 (D. Mont. Dec. 7,
2007) (on file with author); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10 et seq. (West, Westlaw
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however, invoked a now outdated interpretation of Montana law
regarding damages for injury to real property. Montana’s current
interpretation allows for damages beyond simply the fair market
value of the affected property.
In Ruffatto, the court referred to the “general rule in Montana
. . . that the measure of damages for permanent injuries to real
property is the difference between the value of the property before
130
and after the injury.” But, after Ruffatto, Montana’s view of this
rule changed, in part because the courts recognized that a fair
131
market value cap created a disincentive to restore land. In a
recent decision, the Montana Supreme Court explained:
Montana formerly followed the presumption that
diminution in market value constituted the appropriate
measure of damages for injury to property. The Court
always had recognized, however, that no single measure of
damages can serve in every case to compensate adequately
an injured party. Our decision in Sunburst officially
rejected any one-size-fits-all approach to property
damages. A review of the circumstances giving rise to the
decision in Sunburst to broaden the available remedies in
property damages cases provides helpful guidance in
132
resolving [the plaintiff’s] claim.
In the Sunburst decision, referred to above, the Montana
Supreme Court acknowledged that fair market value often does not
provide a complete picture of the scope of damages for injury to
real property in all cases:
It is clear that the market value of land will not always
correspond directly to a plaintiff’s damages resulting from
an injury to real property, thus rendering diminution in
market value an inadequate measure of the property’s
worth to the owner. Other courts have acknowledged that
“the loss in market value is a poor gauge of damage” when
the property gains its principal value from personal use
133
rather than for pecuniary gain.”
through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
130. Ruffatto, CV-06-32-BLG-RFC, at 4 (citing Burk Ranches, Inc. v. State, 790
P.2d 443, 445–46 (Mont. 1990)), abrogated by Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000
(Mont. 2011).
131. Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004 (citing Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.,
165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007)).
132. Id. (internal citations omitted).
133. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088 (citations omitted).
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The Montana Supreme Court elaborated on Sunburst in
134
another case, Lampi v. Speed. The Lampi court explained that in
Sunburst, Texaco operated a gasoline refinery near Sunburst,
Montana, and had a leak that contaminated the water and soil in a
135
neighboring town. Residents sought damages sufficient to restore
their property, and Texaco argued that it should only have to pay
136
the market value of the land it had contaminated. The court
instructed the jury to award damages sufficient to restore the
property, noting that “[l]ittle incentive would exist for tortfeasors
to prevent or remediate contamination, especially in parts of
Montana where property values are relatively low, if restoration
137
damages could not exceed a property’s market value.” The court
concluded that “statutory and common laws, such as environmental
laws can compel repair or restoration costs in excess of the
138
diminution in market value.”
The detailed discussion of Sunburst in Lampi makes it clear that
current Montana law supports the Restatement’s position that fair
139
market value does not cap a landowner’s damages in every case.
The Montana Supreme Court in Sunburst joined “other
jurisdictions in adopting the flexible guidelines of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 929, and comment b, for the calculation of
damages to real property to ensure that plaintiffs receive a proper
140
remedy for their injuries.”
Returning to Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., which was brought
under North Dakota’s Surface Damage Act, the U.S. District Court
for the District of North Dakota agreed that damages were not
capped by diminution in value for a claim brought under North
Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1. The court relied on the text
of the Surface Damages Act, however, and not the Restatement
relied upon by the Supreme Court of Montana, finding “that
compensable damages under North Dakota Century Code section
38-11.1-04 are not necessarily capped by the fair market value of the

134. 261 P.3d 1000.
135. Id. at 1004.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (internal citations omitted).
139. See Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004 (“The [Sunburst c]ourt adopted the
restoration damages rule from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 929.” (citing
Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088)).
140. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088.
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141

surface estate.” Although courts in other jurisdictions have begun
to recognize the need for restoration damages in situations where
oil and gas contamination occurs, this is not universal, and is not
142
necessarily the case in North Dakota outside of chapter 38-11.1.
The underlying purpose of damages in our tort system should
address both the need for compensation to injured parties as well
as deterrence of situations giving rise to such damages.
b.

North Dakota Courts Are Substantially Limited Because the
Fair Market Value Cap Is Statutory

It is significant to note that Montana changed its view on scope
of damages even though its oil and gas surface damage
compensation law does not include the strong language of North
143
Dakota’s law with regard to its intent and purpose.
North
Dakota’s statute states clearly that “the purpose of this chapter [is]
to provide the maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection
to surface owners and other persons from the undesirable effects of
144
development of minerals.” The Supreme Court of North Dakota
has also cited favorably to section 929 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which was relied upon in part by the Supreme Court of
Montana in refusing to limit damages based on market value or
145
diminution in value. The rule in North Dakota, however, has
141. Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (D.N.D. 2012).
142. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-09.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). But see id. chs. 32–40 (Environmental Law
Enforcement Act). Although there are no reported decisions on these chapters of
the North Dakota Century Code, it is likely that a court would find that the fair
market value cap does not apply to these chapters for the same reasons as it does
not apply to North Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1. The very underpinnings
of the shift in judicial thinking away from strict adherence to this cap on damages
is even more compelling under a statutory scheme specifically set up to ensure
compliance with environmental laws and protection of natural resources.
143. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (“The purpose of this part is to provide for the protection of surface owners
of land underlaid with oil and gas reserves while allowing for the necessary
development of those reserves.”), with N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02
(Westlaw) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to provide the maximum amount of
constitutionally permissible protection to surface owners and other persons from the
undesirable effects of development of minerals.” (emphasis added)).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02 (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
145. See Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832, 840 (N.D. 1990) (citing
section 929 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that “it is
generally recognized that damages for loss of use may be awarded in addition to
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questionable application to different statutes as discussed, and an
explicit amendment to section 32-03-09.1 of North Dakota Century
Code specifically excluding real property from its application
would make the law clear and it would be helpful in avoiding
litigation over interpretive issues.
V. ALTHOUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM HAS MADE PROGRESS IN
ADDRESSING THE FAIRNESS OF REMEDIES FOR SURFACE OWNERS,
MORE IS NEEDED.
The oil and gas industry has often argued for limitations on
damages that are awarded to surface owners. There are an
abundance of policy reasons to resist the pressure to do so. For
example, with respect to North Dakota’s Surface Damage Act, one
mineral developer argued that the statute was unconstitutional
because, inter alia, it did not require a surface owner to apply
damage payments to land restoration, and therefore was not
146
forwarding the public policy of protecting agricultural land. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining as follows:
Nor does the absence of a requirement that compensated
surface owners apply damage payments to restorative
purposes render the statute incapable of advancing the
public welfare. The requirement that mineral developers
compensate surface owners for damage they cause may
well serve as an incentive for developers not to drill, and
thereby disrupt surface uses, where drilling is not likely to
yield enough oil or gas to justify the loss to the economy
from
disruption
of
surface
productivity.
The
compensation requirement might also create an incentive
for developers not to cause unnecessary surface damage,
and to remedy any damage—avoidable or unavoidable—
they may cause without necessitating resort to the courts
by surface owners suing under the terms of a lease or
147
under the common law of negligence.

diminution in the value of the property”); see also Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000,
1004 (Mont. 2011) (citing section 929 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
the proposition that “an award of restoration damages in excess of the property’s
diminution in market value” is warranted in certain cases because “diminution in
market value will not always correspond with a plaintiff’s damages resulting from
injury to real property”).
146. Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1984).
147. Id.
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This is not the only time the industry has attempted to limit
damages in such a way. One striking example comes from a
148
Louisiana case and legislative amendments. J. Michael Veron has
written about a saga in Louisiana he handled, referred to as the
149
“Corbello litigation.” In that litigation, the defendant oil and gas
operators argued that the landowner should not be entitled to
restoration damages because it was not certain that the landowner
150
would actually use the money to restore the land.
The
landowners agreed to escrow a portion of their damages specifically
151
to be used for cleanup. Once a plan was agreed upon, the
landowners discovered they needed what they believed was a
152
standard permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. As Mr. Veron
has explained:
In a remarkable turn of events, the Corbello
consultant was informed that the permit was not being
issued. Instead, he was summoned to a meeting in Baton
Rouge with [Army] Corps of Engineers representatives, as
well as representatives from state agencies. When he
arrived, he was surprised to find one of Shell’s attorneys
from the trial at the meeting, as well as an attorney
representing Exxon. No one explained to the landowners’
representative why oil company lawyers had been invited
to the meeting or what right they had to discuss whether a
wetlands permit should be issued to allow the landowners
to begin cleaning up their property.
It soon became apparent that the attorneys were there
to oppose the landowners’ plans. While they were
excluded from the meeting at the landowners’ insistence,
they were invited to meet with the regulators separately
afterward. While the exact nature of the oil companies’
opposition was not disclosed to the landowners, it was
unquestionably effective: Despite repeated efforts over the
following year, the landowners were never able to obtain a
153
permit.

148. J. Michael Veron, Oilfield Contamination Litigation in Louisiana: Property
Rights on Trial, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2011).
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 13–14.
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This outcome defies common sense, and is an alarming
example of the need for a hard look at the influence of the oil and
gas industry on landowner remedies.
Thus, there have been some improvements in the law,
recognized by shifts in the thinking of Montana courts regarding
the fair market value cap, and the explicit recognition in Wyoming
that comparable easements are acceptable measures of fair market
value. On the other hand, there remains significant pressure from
the oil and gas industry to constrain the legal remedies available to
landowners, as is appallingly exemplified by Mr. Veron’s
experience in Louisiana. North Dakota is similar in that it has
made improvements, such as adopting North Dakota Century Code
chapter 38-11.1 to address compensation for surface owners, and it
also has an eminent domain statute that can be interpreted to allow
the comparable easement testimony that is explicitly recognized in
Wyoming. It is imperative, however, that all three branches of
government in North Dakota recognize that there are still
significant hindrances to providing complete justice to landowners
faced with the negative impacts of the oil boom. Courts have
interpreted chapter 38-11.1 to constrain damages beyond what was
intended by the Legislative Assembly, something that both North
Dakota courts and the legislative branch can, but have not,
addressed. While courts have allowed landowner testimony
regarding third party easements, other courts have refused to allow
testimony about condemnor offers of just compensation. There is
significant room for improvement, and so far it does not appear
that any relief for landowners will be forthcoming from the
executive branch. What is certain is that a myopic focus on past
sales of agricultural land is not the way forward with respect to
compensating landowners for the damages caused by oil and gas
development.
The unique nature of real property is important to
understanding the necessity of providing adequate remedies to
landowners beyond nominal damages based on arbitrary views of
market value. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
recognizes that contracts for the sale of land have historically been
given a “special place in the law of specific performance” because
land is unique and therefore “impossible of duplication by the use
154
of any amount of money.”
154.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 360 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
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Judge Loren Smith, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Claims,
explained it as follows:
First, the law considers each parcel of land unique. Unlike
money, or most personal property, it is not fungible. Its
location can never be exactly duplicated, and each
location has a unique value. Second, the owner of land
rarely has the same degree of liquidity as the owner of
personal property such as stocks, bonds, gold, or the like.
If someone does something I object to near my land, I
generally have to deal with that action, rather than shift
my assets. Third, people have deep emotional
attachments to land that they rarely have towards the
other common types of wealth. Fourth, a piece of land is
part of a community, always connected to other land, and
existing in a matrix of roads, rivers, and the whole of
155
civilized society.
Mineral developers often look at past sales of agricultural land
and assume that is the value they must pay for destroying it. This
assumption is based on an incredibly misguided presumption: if a
rancher is approached and asked to lease or sell a parcel of land to
his neighbor so that his neighbor can grow wheat or run some
cattle, the farmer will charge a certain price. If that neighbor
approached the rancher and asked to buy the land to dump
sterilizing wastewater or construct an industrial site on that land,
the rancher would probably say no—but on the off chance the
answer was yes, the price would be much greater.
So when mineral developers argue that they need only pay the
same rates as past agricultural sales, they are saying to the
landowner: “We’re paying you the market rate for those acres of
agricultural land, or even more. You should be happy.” The
landowner’s response: This land was not for sale.
VI. CONCLUSION
The valuation of damages caused by energy development is
exceptionally important because it is often the only remedy
available to landowners faced with the negative impacts of such
development. Surface owners typically view the energy developers
as guests on their property, but unfortunately, developers more
(emphasis added).
155. Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 507, 518 (1998).
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often view themselves as the dominant property owner in the
situation. When surface owners lack the ability to control what is
happening on their own property, whether due to eminent domain
laws or a severed mineral estate, it is imperative that these
landowners are at least compensated for the true damage caused to
their land, and their quality of life.
The friction between developers attempting to minimize
damage awards, and landowners demanding full and just
compensation for the actual disruption energy development causes
to their land and livelihoods has been played out in both the
judicial and legislative forums. This friction will continue in both
forums, and it is crucial for judges and lawmakers to recognize that
this issue is not simply a matter of the price of an acre of land. It is
a matter of creating policies and laws that protect the most
important resources humanity has: our air, our water, and our
land.

